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"ALL CRETANS ARE LIARS": THE FIGHT
AGAINST CORPORATE CRIME
JOHN FLOOD
John Braithwaite. Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). viii + 440
pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $45.00.
Susan P. Shapiro. Wayward Capitalists: Target of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime, 1984). xx + 227
pp. Notes, figures, tables, bibliography, index. $26.00.
Studying crime or criminals places the researcher in a quan-
dary: Do I go out on the job with criminals? What if it is a bur-
glary? Do I abandon all moral stances and just get on with it? Pol-
sky (1967: 135) is a criminal camp follower: "Studying a criminal
in his natural setting ... means studying him in his usual environ-
ments rather than yours, in his living quarters or streets or tav-
erns or wherever, not in your home or your laboratory." These
are tight strictures to follow, but if one is trying to discover what
criminals do and how they do it, it may be the best, although ex-
hausting, way. In an engaging, albeit egocentric and narcissistic
study of professional villains, Taylor (1984) was sponsored in the
criminal community by a former professional criminal who had
just completed a sociology degree in prison. Nevertheless, Taylor
kept his distance, committing no crimes except for some after-
hours drinking. All his information came vicariously through in-
terviews, but when you interview a con man, how do you know if
he is telling you the truth? As Epimenides the Cretan said, "All
Cretans are liars."
John Braithwaite, in Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, and Susan Shapiro, in Wayward Capitalists, take the
process of distancing themselves from their subjects to a further
remove, that of basically relying on official data, with some inter-
viewing. In part this is a function of moving up the scale of crimi-
nality from blue collar to white collar crime. There is simply more
documentation on the latter; furthermore, not everyone defines
white collar crime as crime. Libertarian economists, for example,
would consider insider trading to be a reasonable means of ob-
taining information. This should make us all the more wary about
the Cretan paradox, because corporate entities have more re-
sources with which to dissemble than do ordinary criminals. One
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marked difference between white collar crime and blue collar
crime is that the former is often, on detection, visited with civil
rather than criminal penalties. In Shapiro's sample from the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission's files, 48 percent of offenders
were subject to civil proceedings compared to 21 percent who were
subject to criminal proceedings. Clinard and Yeager (1980) found
that, among Fortune 500 companies, two-thirds of serious offenses
and four-fifths of moderately serious offenses received administra-
tive sanctions. Braithwaite too notes that, by and large, corporate
crimes were not punished.
Despite their methodological constraints, these are timely
books. Shapiro's work assists, in a limited way, our understanding
of the current insider trading scandals on Wall Street. Braith-
waite's study enlightens our present difficulties with, for example,
Burroughs-Wellcome's reluctance to allow the drug AZT to be
tested against other possible remedies for AIDS, and the role of
the Food and Drug Administration in these machinations. Both
tell stories in which the breakdown of trust between producer and
consumer, which is central to a business like the drug industry,
make one very chary about trusting business ever again.
The stories are told in different ways: Braithwaite concen-
trates on a single industry but is encyclopedic in scope; Shapiro ex-
amines the various ways the SEC tracks down offenders in the
United States. Braithwaite conducted 131 interviews with pharma-
ceutical industry executives. He also scoured the Senate Judiciary
Committee's files. Unfortunately, with these potentially rich
sources of data, Braithwaite relies mostly on the committee files
and other secondary sources; the interviews receive short shrift.
The fault does not entirely lie with the author, for in another book
(Fisse and Braithwaite, 1983), he explains how the publisher of
Corporate Crime, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pressured him into
dropping much of the interview data unless he could prove them
to "the satisfaction of a court of law" (p. 7). After the struggle of
interviewing the informants, it is a shame that the interviews had
to be ignored, and it has worked to the detriment of the book.
Shapiro also had to work to obtain her data, for the SEC had never
before let a social scientist poke around in their confidential files.
Her study is predominantly a statistical one, and the reader would
never fully realize that she had, in fact, conducted some observa-
tions.
Braithwaite roams around every part of pharmaceutical corpo-
rate malfeasance, covering the manufacture, testing, distribution,
and marketing of drugs. He could, however, have been more sensi-
tive to cross-cultural issues inasmuch as there is little theoretical
explanation for the countries he selected, namely the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Guatemala, and Mexico.
Corporations resort to bribery to set up plants in countries where
the governments have no testing facilities and rely on the "good-
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will" compliance of the companies to produce and desseminate safe
drugs. Braithwaite (pp. 245-246) states that Guatemala is one such
place in which the companies conspire to prevent egalitarian tax
reforms, suppress labor unions, and align themselves with the CIA
to promote political stability. The drug companies are apparently
without any moral qualms. They will sell drugs, whether needed
or not, whether safe or not, for the greatest possible profit to
Third World countries, which have few resources to counter them.
For example, Parke-Davis produced a drug, chloramphenicol, that
is primarily used to treat diseases such as typhoid. Throughout
Latin America the company promoted its use for a plethora of
complaints from tonsillitis to eye infections to gonorrhea, without
any warning of the side effects, which range from deafness to
death. In addition, when an epidemic of typhoid occurred in Mex-
ico, the prior indiscriminate use of the drug had rendered it use-
less for its original purpose. Even within the United States the
companies will push drugs, such as antidepressants, that not only
have deleterious side effects but also fail to cure the underlying
cause of the disease.
One particular observation by Braithwaite is the discrepancy
between external and internal regulation. As I suggested earlier,
the forces of external regulation can be rendered powerless if
there are no government inspectors or, when they do exist, if the
companies are able to camouflage their faults from the inspectors
by such means as using scientists who regularly test their products
and can be relied upon not to submit distressing results. As one
quality control manager said to Braithwaite (p. 139), "'Govern-
ment inspectors ensure the quality of your records, not the quality
of your deeds.'" With respect to internal regulation, the contrary
is true. The drug companies know where infringements of the cor-
rect procedures occur. Knowledge of the faults, however, does not
necessarily mean that the companies will prevent a batch of faulty
drugs from entering the market, for holding back a suspect batch
might alienate a major customer. But, on a counterintuitive note,
the companies' rules regarding their workers are sometimes more
stringent than the government's.
Shapiro's book is odd, for its title bears little relation to what
is inside the covers. The work is merely a statistical analysis of the
efficacy of various detection strategies employed by the SEC. Sha-
piro is without doubt thorough in her analysis of the agency's
records from 1948 to 1972, perhaps overly thorough. Every page is
full of endless lists of every possible percentage that could be tedi-
ously computed from her data. It is a catalogue of crimes. More-
over, she promises a historical perspective that never materializes.
Her data are presented and interpreted in such a way that any
diachronic component remains hidden. The problem is an old one:
Not all Ph.D. dissertations make readable books. This one would
have been ideal as a government report or at best an article.
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The one point that comes through clearly in Shapiro's book is
that the SEC is too understaffed and underfunded to carry out its
mandate thoroughly. As she (pp. 68-69) notes, "Unfortunately, the
exploitation and integration of many of [the] intelligence opportu-
nities is tenuous at best." The commission uses approximately fif-
teen detection strategies, ranging from insider information to sur-
veillance to inspections of securities' filings. Each, Shapiro (p. 167)
writes, "reveals that the social organization of illicit activities de-
termines the way they are detected and, therefore, that different
strategies of intelligence catch different kinds of securities of-
fenses." So, although some strategies yield more culprits than
others, the others cannot be abandoned because a range of offenses
would be omitted. The SEC will therefore always be over-
stretched.
Both books finish with policy statements. Braithwaite locates
his within the domain of what the law can and cannot achieve,
that is, what are the limits of the law? In effect, what is the bal-
ance between punishment and persuasion? He delineates the
strategies that can and could be used against drug companies, in-
cluding the imprisonment of executives (he interviewed two exec-
utives who claim to be "vice-presidents responsible for going to
jail" (p. 308)), fines, and coercion by the regulatory agencies. The
question is, according to Braithwaite, how Draconian can govern-
ment be in a liberal democracy? Shapiro's coda is nothing more
than a piecemeal list of suggested improvements for the SEC's in-
telligence work. It is not set in the context of any sociological the-
ory, nor even wider policy considerations.
If you move your research out of the criminal's home and into
the laboratory, what kind of results do you get? One, I would sug-
gest, that has too many filters between it and reality. But given
that caveat, if you want to know how the pharmaceutical industry
works (or fails to work) read Braithwaite; Shapiro, unfortunately,
will not tell you much about either capitalists or the SEC.
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